INDOCHINA

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SECURITY INFORMATION

NSC

I. General

A. Conflict still stalemate

 No early military victory for either side (unless Communist China invades)

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Different from Korea stalemate most due rooled

1. Basic problem is political -- people apathetic (Two

2. Substantial political progress prerequisite for victory

3. No easy solution in sight

a. Hard to reconcile Nationalist aspirations with

French position - Senattanen juguer and the forth in event of purpose to y any right and a landing with one communism in I.C.

Military Picture SECURITY INFORMATION

- A. Tonkin scene of major fighting around the periodic or will.
- B. Sporadic guerrilla activity elsewhere and cut of gammun.
- C. Comparative strengths
 - 1. French Union -- 480,000

 of these 195,000 are regular French Army
 - 2. Viet Minh -- 300,000
- D. New Viet Minh offensive indicated
 - 1. Forces now resupplied and trained
 - 2. Objective possibly northern Laos; also Delta
- E. Rainy season closes down in 6-8 weeks

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SECURITY INFORMATION

III. Burden on France

A. Personnel

1. 90,000 casualties 1945 - Oct 1952

- 2. 26% of officers, 37% of noncoms in Indochina
- 3. Casualties exceed St. Cyr graduates, French claim

Financial

- 1. Indochina takes $1\frac{1}{4}$ billion. (total military budget 4 billion)
- 2. Total cost since 1945 over \$4 billion

SECURITY INFORMATION

IV. External Aids

- A. Aid to Viet Minh from Communist China began early 1951
 - 1. Consists of training, advisers, materiel
 - 2. Scale: 2-3,000 advisers; 5-700 tons supplies a month
 - 3. Indications of recent increase
- B. US aid to French Union forces
 - 1. French equipment deficiencies now overcome 250 ships since 1951
 - 2. Value of aid in 1953 will be \$777 million.



V. Vietnam National Army



A. Purpose

- SECURITY INFORMATION
- 1. France cannot provide more troops
- 2. Answer is to build strong native army
- B. Progress to date
 - 1. For 5 years little has been done to create this army
 - 2. Biggest problem is training officers
 - 3. Most rank and file (total 58,000) are from French Army
- C. Current Plans
 - 1. Recently plans laid for immediate increase of Viet army (Increase to 54 battalions in 1954)
 - 2. But morale low in existing units
 - 3. French may go slow for fear it might overthrow French
 - 4. French also fear this Army might provoke Chinese invasion



VI. Vietnam Government

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- A. Organization
 - 1. Viet Government provisional and in formative stage
 - 2. Bao Dai is Chief of State and appoints premier
 - 3. No legislat**uv**e, few good leaders
- B. International Status
 - 1. International status: "independence within French Union"
 - 2. French have certain privileges (full military control and veto of economic decisions)
 - 3. No Asian state, except Thailand, sends envoys

VII. Current Political Situation



- A. Favorable aspects
 - 1. Premier is vigorous Nguyen Van Tam
 - a. Has made some social and economic reforms
 - b. Staged municipal elections last January
 - c. Elections largely returned anti-French and anti-Government representatives
 - 2. Governor Tri of Tonkin an effective leader
 - a. He has made progress in bringing French & Viets together
- B. Unfavorable aspects
 - 1. Vietnamese, however, still resent French
 - a. Viets uncooperative with own Government
 - b. Suspect it of being a French puppet
 - c. These attitudes cause Army's low morale
 - d. Also reason for failure to subvert the Viet Minh

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VIII. Conclusion

- A. French argue cannot give further political concessions
 - 1. French say their National Assembly would withhold money
 - 2. French feel their sacrifices warrant privileged position
- B. Situation thus stalemated both politically and militarily
 - 1. French course appears to be to hold status quo
 - 2. Hope for an over-all Far East settlement



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